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Abstract
This study aims to investigate the effect of family ownership on productivity, the
difference on the productivity level between family managers and professional
managers, and to evaluate whether family firm better to hire professional manag-
ers or family managers. Implementing purposive method on 535 companies listed
on The Indonesian Stock Exchange in sampling technique, this study ended-up
with 144 listed companies as a sample for five years (2011-2015), thus totally
there are 720 company year observations. Then, this study uses OLS regression to
test the hypotheses. The findings show that family ownership affects negatively
on firm productivity which is measured by Standard Cobb-Douglas production
function. Moreover, family managers are less productive than professional man-
agers. Therefore, this study recommends the family firm hire professional manag-
ers to improve firm productivity. To the best of my knowledge, it is the first study
which relates the family ownership and firm productivity in Indonesia. Thus it
will be beneficial in knowledge development in this research field.
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Abstrak
Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengetahui pengaruh kepemilikan keluarga terhadap
produktivitas, perbedaan tingkat produktivitas antara manajer keluarga dan manajer
profesional, dan untuk mengevaluasi apakah perusahaan keluarga lebih baik mempekerjakan
manajer profesional atau manajer keluarga. Dengan menerapkan metode purposive dalam
teknik sampling pada 535 perusahaan yang tercatat di Bursa Efek Indonesia, penelitian ini
mendapatkan 144 perusahaan tercatat sebagai sampel selama lima tahun observasi (2011-
2015), sehingga totalnya ada 720 observasi. Kemudian, penelitian ini menggunakan regresi
OLS untuk menguji hipotesis. Temuan tersebut menunjukkan bahwa kepemilikan keluarga
berpengaruh negatif terhadap produktivitas perusahaan yang diukur dengan fungsi produksi
Standard Cobb-Douglas. Selain itu, manajer keluarga kurang produktif daripada manajer
profesional. Oleh karena itu, penelitian ini merekomendasikan perusahaan keluarga untuk
mempekerjakan manajer profesional guna meningkatkan produktivitas perusahaan.
Sepengetahuan saya, ini adalah studi pertama yang menghubungkan antara kepemilikan
keluarga dan produktivitas perusahaan di Indonesia, sehingga akan sangat membantu
dalam pengembangan pengetahuan dalam topik yang diteliti yaitu hubungan kepemilikan
keluarga dan produktivitas.
Kata kunci: Kepemilikan Keluarga; Perusahaan Keluarga; Manajer Keluarga; Manajer
Profesional; Fungsi Produksi Cobb-Douglas
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Agency problems according to Jensen & Mecking
(1976) will arise when managers as agent manage
the company not usually in accordance with the
shareholders’ interests as principal. However, such
problems are less likely in the family firms, because
managers generally come from family members who
are also the firm’s owners. Moreover, due to the
presence of over-dominant family members in the
family firm, it is likely to appear another agency
model that is the gap between the majority share-
holders from the family member who runs the com-
pany with the minority shareholders from external
parties.
One definition explains that a company is con-
sidered as a family firm if two or more family mem-
bers are directly involved in overseeing the
company’s finances (Anderson, Mansi, & Reeb, 2003;
Andres, 2008; Suyono, 2015). The family firm has a
characteristic that can give advantages or disadvan-
tages to the various parties involved in the firm.
Barth, Gulbrandsen, & Schøne (2005) analyzed the
relationship between family ownership and firm
productivity in managerial terms and concluded that
family firms are less productive than non-family
firms. The study considers that productivity differ-
ences are caused by the different regimes brought
by each manager in managing the firm. Further-
more, about the decision in hiring the manager,
whether the company will hire managers who come
from the family members or hire professional man-
agers. Barth, Gulbrandsen, & Schøne (2005) con-
cluded that in a family firm the hiring of profes-
sional managers would be more productive than the
hiring of family managers.
Meanwhile, a study in the US corporations
conducted by Anderson, Mansi, & Reeb (2003)
evaluated the relationship between family owner-
ship and the agency cost of debt concluded that
when the CEOs from family members lead the busi-
ness, such condition precisely leads to higher cost
of debt compared to when the CEOs from outside
the family lead the business. Moreover, Andres
(2008) found that the performance of family firms is
better than non-family firms only when the found-
ing family members are still active in corporate
management and the firm performance declines in
the next generation. Similarly, Lodh, Nandy, & Chen
(2014) found that family ownership positively af-
fects innovation by managers in the Indian listed
companies and that innovation will increase when
the family firms hire professional managers from
non-family members.
Chen, Cheng, & Dai (2007) examined the ef-
fect of family-owned firms in the US-listed corpo-
rations in addressing agency issues related to CEO
turnover decisions and company performance. The
study focused on three types of public companies in
the US, namely: family firms with family CEO, a
family firm with professional CEO, and non-family
firms. The results concluded from the study are con-
sistent with the initial predictions that there are
many agency issues between family firms with family
CEO and non-family firms in improving company
performance and they prefer to hire professional
CEOs in improving company performance.
Gedajlovic & Carney (2010) evaluated why
family businesses survive and what factors influ-
encing the survival of family businesses in terms of
industrial and geographical differences by using
generic non-tradables identification (GNTs). Even
though there are many types of industries in the
family firms, they are able to posit the type of as-
sets and combine them with generic non-tradables
(GNTs), so that it can serve as the reason that fam-
ily firms still get benefits from their business. Liu,
Yang, & Zhang (2012) also examined the extent to
which the company’s performance is owned by the
family members and concluded that ownership con-
centration and family management affect the per-
formance of the family firms.
Bennedsen et al. (2015) conducted a study on
family firms in China and concluded that leader-
ship succession within family firms in China is one
form of adaptation of environmental opportunities
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in organizing family firms. Bertrand et al. (2008)
studied 93 large corporations in Thailand and found
a strong positive influence on the relationship be-
tween the percentage of family ownership and fam-
ily involvement in corporate management and con-
trol within the family firms. On the other hand,
Bunkanwanicha, Fan, & Wiwattanakantang (2013)
found that the proportion of shares owned by a
group of family (family ownership) will increase
when the company’s partners come from a fellow
family in Thailand corporations.
Sciascia & Mazzola (2008) found empirical
evidence in Italy that when family members inter-
vene in corporate management, the company’s per-
formance will decrease. This finding is supported
by subsequent studies in Italy conducted by Barbera
& Moores (2013) and Cucculelli et al. (2014). In line
with findings in Italy, Burkart, Panunzi, & Shleifer
(2003) using the family ownership and ownership
management model held by the owners of the com-
pany assumed a professional manager is better than
a family manager in maintaining the balance of cor-
porate income and protecting the firm’s interests.
King & Santor (2008) conducted a study on the per-
formance of family firms in 613 listed companies in
Canada during 1998-2005 and found that family and
non-family firms wherein the ownership structure
had only a single share (common stock only) did
not differ but for companies with multiple shares
(common stock and preferred stock) then the per-
formance of non-family firms is better than the family
firms. Moreover, Caselli & Di-Giuli (2009) found that
family firms with non-family CFOs are better than
those of family firms using family CFOs. Villalonga
& Amit (2010) found that when the company’s
founders and their families have strong control over
companies, it can provide a competitive advantage
for all shareholders. Barontini & Bozzi (2010) ex-
amined CEO compensation and performance in fam-
ily firms listed on the Italian Stock Exchange from
1998 to 2002 and showed that family firms pay their
CEO better compared to other companies, and own-
ership structures have a significant influence on CEO
compensation. Therefore, with a better CEO com-
pensation in the family firms, it encourages a better
firm performance.
Various previous studies documented that
most companies in many countries prefer non-fam-
ily managers rather than family managers to improve
the company performance. Meanwhile, several pre-
vious studies in Indonesia also researched family
firm issues such as Bambang & Hermawan (2013),
Diyanti, Widyawati, & Husnah (2015), Singapurwoko
(2015), Suyono (2016), and Oktavina, Manalu, &
Yuniarti (2018). Diyanti, Widyawati, & Husnah
(2015) concluded that family control through direct
ownership could improve company performance
through alignment effect and family control through
indirect ownership with a pyramidal ownership
structure undermines the company performance
because it tends to generate the influence of abso-
lute control (entrenchment effect). Another conclu-
sion is that leadership of the company owner (fam-
ily member) can improve the company performance
in terms of alignment effect rather than entrench-
ment effect. So, the study concluded that the founder
leadership is better in improving the company per-
formance. Similar results are also presented in
Singapurwoko (2015) which concluded that family
ownership positively affects the firm performance
as measured by ROA. Furthermore, Suyono (2016)
using a sample of 112 firms listed on the Indonesia
Stock Exchange for five years (2009-2013) concluded
that family-controlled firms tend to perform better
compared to non-family firms when financial per-
formance is measured by an accounting measure
(ROA) as well as a market measure (Tobin’s Q).
On the other hand, Bambang & Hermawan
(2013) found that the performance of non-family
firms is better than family firms as measured by
ROA. Moreover, the ownership structure has a nega-
tive effect on the market valuation (Tobin’s Q), and
family members who have high positions in the com-
pany have a negative effect on the company perfor-
mance. Furthermore, Bambang & Hermawan (2013)
argued that some family firms in Indonesia are
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framed under the name “foundations” to enable
managers doing corruption and collusion activities
that ultimately will degrade the company perfor-
mance. Oktavina, Manalu, & Yuniarti, (2018) showed
that the average family firm in Indonesia still uses
Pecking Order Theory in the application of capital
structure.
The relationship between the variables in this
study could be explained by the agency theory,
where Jensen & Meckling (1976) described the
agency relationship between the owners as a prin-
cipal and the managers as an agent. Moreover, the
agency theory argues that in a modern corporation,
in which the shareholding structure tends to spread,
all managers’ activities should be in order to maxi-
mize the stockbrokers’ return (Berle and Means,
1932). The concept of this theory was begun with a
change of relationship in managing a business,
whereas the firm grows, the owners can no longer
manage the firm directly. Therefore the owners will
appoint independent parties as managers who will
manage the company’s daily activities. As a result,
because managers govern the day-to-day company’s
activities, while the owners only receive reports from
managers quarterly or annually, ultimately the man-
agers have more knowledge on the details of the
company activities than the owners. This condition
raises asymmetric information between managers
and owners, where managers with the superiority
of information about the company often carry out
actions for the sake of their personal interests that
tend to harm the owners’ interests. This model is
further known as a type 1 agency problem which
usually occurs in large corporations with spreading
ownership structure.
The type 1 of agency problem as described
by Jensen & Meckling (1976) in the preceding para-
graph disappears in the family firms with the domi-
nance of shares’ ownership on the hand of family
members. However, Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb
(2003) explained that although the type 1 of agency
problem does not exist, it does not mean that there
is no agency problem in the family firms. Thus, there
will be another type of agency problem, from now
on referred to as type 2 of the agency problem. This
problem will arise when managers who are domi-
nated by family members of majority shareholders
prioritize their interests in the company’s decision-
making process that harms the interests of minority
shareholders. It is because managers who come from
the majority shareholdings often expropriate the
minority shareholders’ rights in managing corpo-
rate resources that could negatively affect the firm
performance.
Moreover, the relationship between variables
in this study can also be explained by using the stew-
ardship theory from the side of the extent to which
the parties concerned can evaluate the advantages
and disadvantages of the family firm model. Stew-
ardship theory developed by Donaldson & Davis
(1991) has a different perspective from agency
theory when it comes to managers’ role in the com-
pany. This theory assumes that managers are pro-
fessional people appointed by shareholders to run
the business, so their function is to serve the inter-
ests of shareholders in order to maximize their wel-
fare. Given this theory, managers will feel satisfied
when they are able to perform their function. In other
words, under this theory, the managers will not
behave opportunistically but instead, they will do
the best job possible with maximum performance.
This condition will be evident in family firms where
managers generally come from the family members
who control the majority of the company’s shares,
so they will maximize the use of company resources
for the welfare of shareholders who are members
of their family (Zellweger, Eddleston, &
Kellermanns, 2010; Berrone, Cruz, & Gómez-Mejía
2012). However, other researchers have the oppo-
site view of the benefits that family firms can turn
out to be disadvantageous when there is a conflict
of interest among family members due to distor-
tions of incentives caused by kinship factors (Gómez-
Mejía et al., 2007; Lumpkin, Brigham, & Moss, 2010;
Cucculelli et al., 2014; Barbera & Moores, 2013; Lodh,
Nandy, & Chen, 2014). In other words, the involve-
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ment of managers from the family members can
lower the value of the firm.
In order to bridge the research gap as de-
scribed above, this study uses the productivity as a
proxy for the company performance. Palia &
Lichtenberg (1999) defined productivity as the ra-
tio of output (real) to the input (real). The defini-
tion emphasizes more real output and input than
output and nominal input in order to eliminate the
effect of price changes when making productivity
comparison. Because firm uses more than one in-
put, there are several ways to determine the pro-
ductivity. It is possible to determine the size of par-
tial productivity, based only on a portion of the in-
puts used by the firm, as in labor productivity where
it is calculated from the output per unit of labor di-
vided by input per unit of labor (Palia & Lichtenberg,
1999). However, Palia & Lichtenberg (1999) and
Barth, Gulbrandsen, & Schøne (2005) argued that
labor productivity is an imperfect measure of effi-
ciency since it does not account for the output con-
tribution of other non-collaborative inputs. Further-
more, Palia, & Lichtenberg (1999) and Barth,
Gulbrandsen, & Schøne (2005) argued that a pro-
ductivity measure that is able to show a good effi-
ciency index and provide the appropriate weight
for services of all inputs used by a firm is a Stan-
dard Cobb-Douglas production function. Following
the views of Palia & Lichtenberg (1999) and Barth,
Gulbrandsen, & Schøne (2005), this study uses the
Standard Cobb-Douglas production function as a
proxy of firm productivity besides no previous re-
search in Indonesia that linked family ownership
and firm productivity by using this proxy.
This study intends to re-examine the findings
of previous studies in Indonesia that have conflict-
ing results (Bambang & Hermawan, 2013; Diyanti,
Widyawati, & Husnah, 2015; Singapurwoko, 2015;
and Suyono, 2016) by further specifying the rela-
tionship between family ownership and company
performance assessed by the firm productivity as
measured by the Standard Cobb-Douglas produc-
tion function, as well as further testing to evaluate
the level of company productivity in different mana-
gerial systems (i.e., family managers and non-fam-
ily managers). Moreover, to bridging the gap in the
findings of previous studies in Indonesia, this study
follows an argument stating that productivity can
be used as a more accurate proxy in measuring com-
pany performance compared to financial perfor-
mance as measured by accounting data such as ROE,
ROI, ROA or market data such as Tobin’s Q for sev-
eral reasons (Barth, Gulbrandsen, & Schøne, 2005;
Mannarino, Pupo, & Ricotta, 2011). Firstly, unlike
performance measures presented by external finan-
cial statements (i.e., ROE, ROI, and ROA) that are
more easily manipulated by accountants, produc-
tivity is more difficult to manipulate because it re-
flects the company’s internal performance that
should be reported in a real condition (Palia &
Lichtenberg, 1999). Secondly, productivity is intrin-
sically able to determine the equilibrium value of
financial variables, such as earnings and stock prices
(Morikawa, 2013). Thirdly, market-based perfor-
mance measures (Tobin’s Q) can only be used accu-
rately if the stock market is in the efficient condi-
tion (Brealey, Myers, & Allen, 2016), which is not
the case for the Indonesian Stock Exchange so this
study argues that productivity as a performance
measure will be more appropriate and accurate to
measure the relationship between variables.
Based on existing literature, there is a research
gap in previous studies examining the relationship
between family ownership and company perfor-
mance due to different proxies in measuring com-
pany performance. Various studies in Indonesia such
as Diyanti, Widyawati, & Husnah (2015),
Singapurwoko (2015), and Suyono (2016) who found
a positive relationship between family ownership
and firm performance measured by ROA and Tobin’s
Q, while Bambang & Hermawan (2013) found a
negative relationship. However, when the measure
of performance is firm productivity, the majority of
previous studies abroad found a negative relation-
ship between family ownership and firm produc-
tivity such as in Barth, Gulbrandsen, & Schøne
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(2005), Bloom, Sadun, & Van (2008); Bandiera et al.
(2008); Mannarino, Pupo, & Ricotta (2011), Barbera
& Moores (2013), and Cucculelli et al. (2014).
Based on the research gap as explained above,
this study tries to examine the relationship between
family ownership and firm productivity. Therefore,
this study aims to examine the effect of family own-
ership on the firm productivity, differentiation of
firm productivity levels with different managerial
systems between family managers and professional
managers, and examine whether the family firms
are better to hire family managers or professional
managers.
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
From a theoretical point of view, the influ-
ence of family management on corporate perfor-
mance remains an interesting issue. There are many
conflicting ideas that ultimately encourage research-
ers to test the relationship between these variables.
Empirical evidence also does not provide a similar
answer. Some studies have examined the impact of
family influence on company performance, and the
results are divided into the view that concentrated
family ownership and management of the firm by
the owner may have beneficial economic conse-
quences or otherwise. Therefore, some empirical
evidence suggests that family firms are more prof-
itable or show higher market valuations when man-
agement is handled by the founder (Martikainen,
Nikkinen, and Vahamaa, 2009). In contrast, some
researchers found that firms with family ownership
have lower economic performance   than non-fam-
ily firms (Caselli & Di-Giuli, 2009; Sciascia & Mazzola,
2008; Chaney, Faccio, & Parsley, 2011; Barbera &
Moores, 2013; Cucculelli et al., 2014).
Several previous studies in Asia, including
Indonesia, concluded that the corporate sector in
these countries is dominated by family-owned com-
panies (Gul, Kim, & Qiu, 2010) with relatively weak
corporate governance practices (Chaney, Faccio, &
Parsley, 2011). Direct monitoring and substantial
control by the family is considered an agency prob-
lem that can lead to different corporate disclosure
practices between family and non-family firms
(Chaney, Faccio, & Parsley, 2011). On the other hand,
some studies have found that negative effects will
arise when the next generation within the family
firms runs the business and found that family firms
with family managers run the business with worse
performance (Caselli & Di-Giuli, 2009; Sciascia &
Mazzola, 2008).
As for previous studies abroad linking family
ownership to productivity, it generally results in a
negative relationship between family ownership and
productivity. For the case in Norway, Barth,
Gulbrandsen, & Schøne (2005) documented a nega-
tive relationship between family management and
firm productivity as measured by the Standard
Cobb-Douglas production function. Bloom, Sadun,
& Van (2008) showed that Italian entrepreneurs are
reluctant to formally hand over the management of
the company to managers from outside parties that
ultimately reduce the firm productivity. Further-
more, Bandiera et al. (2008) confirmed these find-
ings. Similar results also occurred in Mannarino,
Pupo, & Ricotta (2011) which found that family firms
are significantly less productive, as measured by
total factor productivity (TFC) than non-family
firms. Subsequent studies in Italy (Barbera &
Moores, 2013; Cucculelli et al., 2014) also corrobo-
rated these findings. The relatively recent findings
in Italy also confirmed that the productivity of fam-
ily firms is much lower than those of the non-family
firms (Damieni, Pompei, & Ricci, 2016). Furthermore,
for the case in Japan Morikawa (2013) reported that
the productivity of family firms is worse than non-
family firms.
This study is more likely to use theory agency
in the context of family firms as described by Ander-
son, Mansi, and Reeb (2003) which states that the
presence of over-dominant family members in the
company can create an entrenchment effect that can
negatively affect the company performance. It is
because with the dominance of shares ownership,
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they can take the minority shareholders’ rights to
prioritize the group of family interests so that fam-
ily firms dominated by family managers generally
have a poor performance (Caselli & Di-Giuli, 2009;
Sciascia & Mazzola, 2008; Lumpkin, Brigham, &
Moss, 2010). Furthermore, the majority of previous
studies found a negative relationship between fam-
ily ownership and performance as measured by firm
productivity (Barth, Gulbrandsen, & Schøne, 2005;
Bloom, Sadun, & Van, 2008; Bandiera et al., 2008;
Mannarino, Pupo, & Ricotta, 2011; Morikawa, 2013;
Barbera & Moores, 2013; Cucculelli et al., 2014; and
Damieni, Pompei, & Ricci, 2016). Therefore, based
on entrenchment effect argument in the agency
theory and majority findings of previous studies as
explained above, the first hypothesis is developed
as follows:
H1: family ownership affects negatively on the
firm productivity
With regard to the difference between man-
agers from the group of family (i.e., family manag-
ers) and managers from outside parties (professional
managers), the agency theory predicts the positive
impact of the owner’s management on the value of
the firm, as the owner’s management is able to align
the interests of owners and managers (Jensen &
Mechling, 1976). However, this effect may decrease
with the cost of family management. Family man-
agers are generally not recruited from the general
market for managers, and this situation generally
leads to lower quality among owner managers rather
than professional managers because the recruitment
procedures do not follow certain qualification stan-
dards. Commonly, the recruitment of managers
from the family members is only based on the close
relationship among family member without consid-
ering relevant expertise to his/her job, so that when
the quality of managers from the family members is
low, automatically will reduce the firm productiv-
ity. Moreover, family-owned firms tend to be char-
acterized by caution in strategic decision making,
because of the close relationship between family and
company assets (Barth, Gulbrandsen, & Schøne,
2005). This avoidance of risk can prevent the own-
ers’ management from adopting contemporary man-
agement concepts in increasing productivity because
it is too risky or violates the family business tradi-
tion. Ultimately, this condition contributes to reduc-
ing the whole company productivity.
Other studies that focus on the effect of
founder leadership on the firm performance pro-
vide mixed results. Cucculelli & Micucci (2008) found
a positive founder effect on firm performance fol-
lowed by the decline of firm performance in the post-
leadership succession in the family firms in Italy. It
indicates that the family managers are only good at
the beginning of the company’s establishment and
becomes worse for the subsequent periods. Bloom,
Sadun, & Van (2008) described that Italian entre-
preneurs are reluctant to formally hand over cor-
porate management to outsiders and this may have
low productivity implications. In an analysis of how
managers are employed and incentives are offered,
Bandiera et al. (2008) confirmed these findings.
Furthermore, other researchers suggested that
many beneficial attributes can be a disadvantage
since conflicts of interest in the family firms can dis-
tort incentives because of kinship behavior (Gómez-
Mejía et al., 2007; Lumpkin, Brigham, & Moss, 2010).
Barth, Gulbrandsen, & Schøne (2005) compared fam-
ily businesses managed by family members of own-
ers and family businesses run by professional man-
agers and found that family firms managed by pro-
fessional managers are more productive than those
family firms managed by family managers. Caselli
& Di-Giuli (2009) and Sciascia and Mazzola (2008)
found that family firms with family managers run
company with worse performance.
Burkart, Panunzi, & Shleifer (2003) argued that
the appointment of family managers who generally
is done without considering certain skill or exper-
tise will lead to the low quality of managers who
can harm the company productivity. Furthermore,
Mannarino, Pupo, & Ricotta (2011) who researched
family firms in Italy found that professional man-
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agers are more efficient in operating firms than
owner-managers. Similarly, Lodh, Nandy, & Chen
(2014) suggested that family firms better hire pro-
fessional managers in order to further enhance the
innovations made by managers.
Based on the arguments built from the find-
ings of previous studies stating that professional
managers are more productive than family manag-
ers, therefore the second and third hypotheses in
this study are formulated as follows:
H2: professional managers are more productive
in managing a business than family managers.
H3: family firms would be better to hire profes-
sional managers than family managers
METHODS
This study uses a sample of all companies
listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange for 2011 to
2015 periods. Moreover, this study implements pur-
posive sampling approach in the sample selection
with criteria as in Table 1.
This study follows several criteria used in
previous studies (Barth, Gulbrandsen, & Schøne,
2005; Mannarino, Pupo, & Ricotta, 2011; Barbera,
2013; Suyono, 2015) as follows, if 33% or more shares
in the company are owned by one person or one
family (group), then classified as a family firm. Mean-
while, if the condition is not met it is classified as a
non-family firm.
If there are > 2 managers who come from the
family members then the company is classified as a
company that uses the family managers, whereas if
there is only one manager or none of the managers
who come from the family members, it means that
the company uses professional managers.
This study uses Standard Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction functions modified by Barth, Gulbrandsen,
& Schøne (2005) and Barbera (2013) to calculate the
extent to which productivity differences existed in
the presence of different ownership structures be-
tween family firms and nonfamily firms. In this case,
Barth, Gulbrandsen, & Schøne (2005) and Barbera
(2013) included the variable family ownership struc-
ture (FAM) with the following formula:
Y = AFAM L K.................................................... (1)
Where:
Y : Value-added reflecting Standard Cobb-
Douglas production function
A : Total Factor Productivity
 : the intercept indicating whether family
firms are more productive (indicated with
a positive sign) or less productive (indicated
with a negative sign) compared to nonfamily
firms.
 : The output of labor elasticity which is the
proportion of labor to the total product pro-
duced.
 : The output of capital elasticity which is the
proportion of capital to the total product
produced
L : Labour
K : Capital
FAM : a dummy variable, where score 1 is given
to the family firms and 0 is given to the
nonfamily firms.
Criteria of Sample Amount 
Listed companies on the Indonesian Stock Exchange for 2011-2015 periods 535  
Listed companies with an incomplete annual report (150) 
Listed companies without purchasing of intermediary goods or raw material and excluding corporations in 
the financial, trading, and investment sectors (233) 
Listed companies with incomplete data related the proxies of variables in this study (8) 
Total Sample  144 
Number of observations for 5 years (2011-2015) 720 
Table 1. Sampling Procedure
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Labor (L) is generated by calculating the num-
ber of labors in the company (available in the an-
nual report). Capital (K) is calculated by adding the
company’s equity and debt.
Furthermore, by following the model devel-
oped by Barth, Gulbrandsen, & Schøne (2005) and
Barbera (2013) in measuring the importance of own-
ership structure, this study included the FAM as a
dummy variable. Therefore, by taking the logarithm
of the production function, the equation is as fol-
lows:
Ln Y= ln A + FAM+  ln L +  ln K ………….. (2)
Where (after controlling all observable vari-
ables)  is the intercept that measures whether fam-
ily firms are more or less productive than non-fam-
ily firms.
In contrast to Barth, Gulbrandsen, & Schøne
(2005) who used two control variables (i.e., type of
industry and stock exchange), this study uses only
one control variable, i.e., type of industry. Stock
exchange as a control variable is excluded because
not relevant for the setting of this study which only
uses listed companies on the Indonesia Stock Ex-
change as the population. The type of industry as a
control variable is a dummy variable which is mea-
sured by following the categorization by the Indo-
nesia Stock Exchange which divides the type of in-
dustry into the main sector (IN1), manufacturing
sector (IN2), and service sector (IN3). Therefore,
the type of industry is measured by dummy vari-
ables in which a score of 1 is given when the firm is
in its industrial sector and 0 if otherwise. Morover,
Following Gujarati and Porter (2009) who argued
that if dummy has a category of m, then one cat-
egory will be excluded so that the number of dummy
variables becomes m-1. Therefore, since the type of
industry has 3 categories, it will remain 2 (3-1) in
the model.
In other words, by Following Barth, Gulbran-
dsen, & Schøne (2005) except for the stock exchange
as a control variable due to not relevant for this study,
to test the first hypothesis stating that family own-
ership negatively affects firm’s productivity, OLS is
used with three research models as follows:
Model 1: This model uses family ownership
(OS_FAM) and the number of labors (L) as inde-
pendent variables and type of industry as a control
variable. Then, Model 1 is presented as follows:
Ln Y =  + 1OS_FAM + 2L + 3IN1 + 4IN2 + 5IN3
+ e......................................................... (3)
Model 2: This model uses family ownership
(OS_FAM), family manager (FAM_MAN), and the
number of labors (L) as independent variables and
type of industry as a control variable. Then, Model
2 is described as follows:
Ln Y =  + 1OS_FAM + 2FAM_MAN + 3L +4IN1
+ 5IN2 + 6IN3 + e…............................ (4)
Model 3: This model uses family ownership
(OS_FAM), family manager (FAM_MAN), number
of labors (L), and capital (K) as independent vari-
ables and type of industry as a control variable.
Then, Model 3 is formulated as follows:
Ln Y =  + 1OS_FAM + 2FAM_MAN + 3L + 4K
+ 5IN1 + 6IN2 + 7IN3 + e …................ (5)
Where:
Ln Y: logarithm of production function
Moreover, to test the second hypothesis stat-
ing that professional managers are more produc-
tive in managing a business than family managers,
this study determines the range of productivity dif-
ferences in the use of family managers and profes-
sional managers. It could be seen from the produc-
tion elasticity which is calculated by using two in-
puts of variables, i.e., labor (L) and capital (K) such
in the model 3, with the following formula (Barth,
Gulbrandsen, & Schøne, 2005; and Barbera, 2013):
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Q = b0 L
b1Kb2………….. (6)
Where:
Q : The elasticity of the production function
b0 : The Efficiency Index (the intercept in the
model 3)
b1 : Parameter L (regression coefficient of L in the
model 3)
b2 : Parameter K (regression coefficient of K in the
model 3)
L : number of labors
K : capital
The second hypothesis testing is done by look-
ing at the difference in the elasticity of the produc-
tion function which describes the difference in pro-
ductivity range between family firms hiring family
managers and family firms hiring professional man-
agers. This hypothesis will be accepted if the pro-
ductivity range of professional managers is higher
than the family managers.
Furthermore, to test the third hypothesis
which states that family firms would be better to
hire professional managers than family managers,
additional analysis is needed to recommend
whether family firms will be better to hire family
managers or professional managers in corporate
management. Following Barth, Gulbrandsen, &
Schøne (2005) and Barbera (2013), this study adds
several control variables such as the number of la-
bors, capital, type of industry, and the return of
capital as described in table 7 on the section of re-
search result.
RESULTS
Descriptive Statistic
Table 2 above explains that the number of fam-
ily firms is larger than nonfamily firms in the Indo-
nesian Stock Exchange, i.e., from 720 observations,
475 observations are family firms (i.e., 65.97%) and
245 observations are nonfamily firms (i.e., 34.03%).
Moreover, from 475 observations of family firms,
220 observations (i.e., 46.32%) hire managers from
family members while the remaining 255 observa-
tions (i.e., 53.68%) hire managers from indepen-
dent/professional parties. This empirical evidence
suggests that family-controlled firms in the Indo-
nesia Stock Exchange hire more professional man-
agers than family managers.
This study measures whether a firm to be con-
sidered as family firm or nonfamily firm by using a
binary variable when OS_FAM = 1 is family firm,
Table 2. Descriptive Statistic
  
Family Firms Non Family Firms 
Mean 
Values 
Standard 
Deviation Median 
Mean 
Values 
Standard 
Deviation Median 
Log Value-Added (Y) 33.8077 1.8845 33.9660 34.0438 1.8159 34.2180 
Log Number of Labors (L) 5.6299 0.2753 5.6699 5.7822 0.1882 5.7930 
Log Capital (K) 28.1773 1.8817 28.2534 28.2607 1.8072 28.4200 
Family Managers (FAM_MAN) 0.4632 0.4992  0.0204 0.1417  
Industry       
 Main Sector 0.1474 0.3548  0.2041 0.4039  
 Manufacturing Sector 0.4526 0.4983  0.4694 0.5001  
  Service Sector 0.4000 0.4904   0.3265 0.4699   
N   475 245 
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otherwise is nonfamily firm (OS_FAM = 0). Follow-
ing Barth, Gulbrandsen, & Schøne (2005), then the
equation for a log of the production function is pre-
sented as follows:
Ln Y = ln A +  FAM +  ln L +  ln K ………….. (7)
Moreover, the equation of the production
function is then explained through the three mod-
els which have differences in function due to addi-
tional control variables in each model.
Before regression analysis, a classical assump-
tion test was performed for all three models includ-
ing normality, heteroscedasticity, and
multicollinearity. Moreover, the homogeneity test
is also conducted to ascertain that the variations of
two or more distributions have similarity or not.
Then, this study runs multiple regression analysis
for the three models, and the summary of the re-
sults is presented in Table 3.
Table 3 above presents a summary of the re-
sults of regression analysis, where the dummy vari-
    Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept 29.985 29.103 .108 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.150) 
Family firms -.135 -.218 -.101 
  (0.037) (0.018) (0.013) 
Family Managers    .244 (0.177) 
0.201 
(0.576) 
Log number of labors .688 .840 1187.286 
  (0.015) (0.006) (0.000) 
Log Capital     9603.505 
      (0.000) 
Industry (ref: Manufacturing)    
 Main Sector .145 .151 .301 
  (0.470) (0.461) (0.757) 
 Service Sector .163 .144 0.217 
  (0.286) (0.323) (0.618) 
R2 adj. 0.007 0.009 .601 
N   720 720 720 
Table 3. The Output of Regression for the Three Model
Estimates of the production function including indicators of family ownership (Model1), family management (Model 2), and capital (Model 3). Estimated
coefficients and standard errors of coefficients in parentheses. Ordinary Least Squares.Dependent variable: Log Value Added.
able of the type of industry for manufacturing sec-
tor (IN2) is excluded from the model. Therefore,
the rest of type of industry variables are the main
sector (IN1) and the service sector (IN3). Then, the
regression equation for the three models is presented
as follows:
Model 1
Ln Y = 29.985 – 0.135 OS_FAM + 0.688 L + 0.145
IN1 + 0.163 IN3 + e
Model 2
Ln Y = 29.103 – 0.218 OS_FAM + 0.244 FAM_MAN
+ 0.840 L + 0.151 IN1+ 0.144 IN3 + e
Model 3
Ln Y= 0.108 – 0.101 OS_FAM + 0.201 FAM_MAN
+ 1187.286 L + 9603.505 K+ 0.301 IN1 + 0.601
IN3 + e
Furthermore, F test is performed for the
above three models as in Table 4.
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Table 4 above shows the R Square for the
model 1, model 2, and the model 3 is 1.3%; 1.5%;
and 70%, respectively. The R Square of the model 1
and the model 2 is relatively small then jumps sig-
nificantly in the model 3. It is because the model 1
and 2 do not include the Capital in calculating the
production function, whereas when the Capital is
included in the model 3, then there is a significant
change on the R Square. Thus it can be concluded
that the measurement of productivity will not be
optimum when the element of Capital is not in-
cluded the model.
Based on the F test above, it can be concluded
that: (1) Ffor the first model, the F-statistic of 3.345
on the significance of 0.049 means that the first model
is fit in explaining the relationship between vari-
ables in this study. (2) For the second model, F-sta-
tistic of 3.243 on the significance of 0.038 means that
the second model is fit to explain the relationship
between variables in this study. (3) For the third
model, the F-statistic of 5.611 on the significance of
0.000 means that the third model is fit to explain the
relationship between the variables in this study.
Based on the above tests, the three models
are fit because the results of F-statistic are below
0.05 and it could be concluded that: (1) family own-
ership negatively affects the firm productivity. (2)
Managers who come from the family members do
not affect the firm productivity. (3) The number of
labors has a significant positive influence on the firm
productivity. (4) Capital has a significant positive
influence on the firm productivity. (5) The type of
industry has no significant influence on the firm
productivity (for both the main sector and the ser-
vice sector). (6) From the results of all testing, it can
be concluded that the first hypothesis is stating that
family ownership negatively affects productivity is
supported.
Model 1 in table 3 above generally also shows
that family firms are lower in the range of produc-
tivity compared to non-family firms. Model 2 is con-
trolled by the variable of family managers
(FAM_MAN). The family firms with less produc-
tive family managers than nonfamily firms. These
results indicate the differences in management re-
gimes in running the business, especially in the as-
 F Sig. R Square Adj R Square 
Model 1 
Model 2 
Model 3 
3.345  
3.243  
5.611  
0.049 
0.038 
0.000 
0.013 
0.015 
0.701 
0.007 
0.009 
0.601 
 R Square Adj. R Square Nilai F (Sig) Nilai t (Sig) Sample 
FAM_MAN = 1 0.801 0.701 7.872 (0.000)  88724.849 (0.000)  220 
FAM_MAN = 0 0.801 0.701 8.433 (0.000)  91833.969 (0.000)  255 
The range of productivity by using one input variable (L)*** 9 
The range of productivity by using two input-variables (L and K)*** 3.5 
The total range of productivity 12.5 
Table 4. The Summary of F-test
Table 5. The Elasticity of Production
Dependent variable: Log Value-Added (Y). Independent Variable: Elasticity of Productivity (Q)
The result of regression calculation in model 3 using two input variables: L (Labor) and K (Capital).
Table 6. The Range of Productivity between Family Managers and Professional Managers (%)
*** The range of productivity by using one input-variable comes from model 1, meanwhile, two input-variables from model 3.
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pect of firm productivity. The addition of capital in
the model 3 improves a negative effect on the model
because the regression coefficient of the family man-
ager in the model 3 decreases by 0.043 from the
number 0.244 (in the model 2) to 0.201 with signifi-
cance value more than 0.05. Furthermore, from table
3 above, it can be concluded that the variable of a
number of labors and capital adequately explain the
level of firm productivity between family firms and
nonfamily firms.
Moreover, to test the second hypothesis in
determining the range of productivity differences
in the use of family managers and professional man-
agers, this study uses the elasticity of production.
The elasticity of production is calculated by using
two input variables, i.e., labor (L) and Capital (K)
in the model 3 following Barth, Gulbrandsen, &
Schøne (2005) and Barbera (2013) as follows:
Q = b0 Lb1Kb2
Where:
Q: The elasticity of the production function
b0: The Efficiency Index (the intercept in the
model 3)
b1: Parameter L (regression coefficient of L in the
model 3)
b2: Parameter K (regression coefficient of K in the
model 3)
L: number of labors
K: capital
Based on the above formula, the value of pro-
duction elasticity for each company and the results
of the analysis can be seen in Table 5.
Based on Table 5 above, the number of ob-
servations used is 475 (i.e., family firms only), which
is divided into two more criteria that are family
firms with family managers (FAM_MAN = 1) and
family firms with professional managers
(FAM_MAN = 0). The Adjusted R Square is 0.701
means that 70% of independent variables properly
explain the dependent variable. The F-statistic in-
creases by 0.561 from 7.872 to 8.433, meanwhile, t-
statistic also increases 3109.12 from 88724.849 to
91833.969. It means that the difference in the elas-
ticity of production function describing the differ-
ence of the firm productivity range between the fam-
ily firms hiring family managers and professional
managers is 12.5%. In other words, the productiv-
ity of professional managers is 12.5% higher than
family managers. The detailed calculation of the
range of productivity is presented in Table 6.
The results presented in Table 5 and 6 above
also support the second hypothesis stating that pro-
fessional managers are more productive than fam-
ily managers. Furthermore, additional test is per-
formed to assess the strength of the test by includ-
ing some control variables such as those of Barth,
Gulbrandsen, & Schøne (2005) as well as to provide
recommendations to the family firms on the mana-
gerial choices that could increase the productivity
of the firm whether better to hire family managers
or professional managers. Then the test is performed
on two group of samples, i.e., the entire sample of
the firms (720 observations) and the sample for the
family firms only (475 observations). The results are
presented in table 7.
In Table 7 above, several alternative models
are employed in the regression analysis by separat-
ing the sample between All Firms criteria using all
observations (720) and Family-Owned Firms crite-
ria using family firms’ observations (475). By enter-
ing several control variables such as in Barth,
Gulbrandsen, & Schøne (2005) and excluding the
sub-sample of non listed firms because not relevant
for this study which uses only companies listed on
the Indonesia Stock Exchange as a sample. Then,
Table 7 above shows several specifications and con-
cludes that there are only eight specifications that
have a significant influence by looking at a signifi-
cance value which is less than 0.05. The use of de-
pendent variable Ln Value Added/Unit of Capital
as a substitute for the previous dependent variable
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Alternative Specifications Number of observations 
All firms Family-owned firms 
Managers from 
owner family 
Family 
Ownership 
Managers from owner 
family 
Dependent variable: Ln Value-added 
per unit of capital 
720/475 -13.420 -7.800 -9.363 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Dependent variable: Total Factor 
productivity 
720/475 0.462 1.348 1.731 
  (0.644) (0.178) (0.084) 
Dependent variable: Ln Sales  720/475 0.511 -0.263 0.496 
  (0.610) (0.793) (0.620) 
Alternatif forms of labor input         
Number of labors replaced by payroll 
cost 
720/475 2.186 0.543 1.670 
 (0.029) (0.587) (0.096) 
Hourly wage added to number of 
labors 
720/475 0.254 0.484 0.130 
 (0.800) (0.629) (0.897) 
a. Subsamples         
 Number of labors     
  a. less than 200 labors 65/60 -0.735 0.800 -0.792    (0.465) (0.936) (0.432) 
  b. 200 labors or more 655/415 0.334 -1.332 0.943    (0.738) (0.183) (0.346) 
b Capital         
  10 billion Rupiah or more 138/91 -0.104 -0.993 0.609    (0.918) (0.323) (0.544) 
  Less than 10 billion Rupiah 582/384 -1.657 -1.939 -1.058       (0.098) (0.053) (0.291) 
c Industry     
  Main Sector 82/41 -0.847 -2.084 -0.174    (0.400) (0.040) (0.862) 
  Manufacturing 210/124 1.137 -0.761 1.267    (0.257) (0.448) (0.208) 
  Services 177/109 -1.337 -0.023 -1.438       (0.183) (0.981) (0.153) 
d Return of capital     
  Dependent variable      
 1 Value-added divided by total capital 
720/475 -13.291 -7.169 -9.768 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 2 Return divided by total capital 720/475 1.419 0.725 1.015     (0.156) (0.469) (0.311) 
Table 7. Alternative Specifications and Robustness Check
Dependent variable: Log value-added.
Return on Capital is regressed on the type of industry and family control variables only.
Estimated coefficients and standard errors. Level significance at 5%
(Ln Value Added) gives significant negative effect
(sig. = 0.000), which can be described as follows: (1)
manager who comes from the family members on
all firms (720 observations) has a significant nega-
tive effect on company productivity. It means that
the use of managers who come from the family
members will actually reduce the level of firm pro-
ductivity. (2) Family ownership has a significant
negative effect on company productivity. It means
that by increasing the number of ownership by fam-
ily members lower the level of firm productivity.
This finding supports the first hypothesis which
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states that family ownership negatively affects the
firm productivity. (3) Managers who come from fam-
ily members in the family firms (475 observations)
have a significant negative effect on the firm pro-
ductivity. Similar to the first case, however, on this
setting, the sample is more emphasized on the own-
ership by family members in the family firms only
that still hire non-professional managers (managers
from the family members). The results show the
decline in the quality of firm productivity in line
with the increasing use of family managers.
Table 7 above also presents some control vari-
ables that have a significant influence on firm pro-
ductivity. Suppose the specification on the input la-
bor that is by replacing the independent variable
number of labors with payroll cost. There is a sig-
nificant positive correlation (sig value = 0.029) re-
sulting from the use of variable payroll cost on com-
pany productivity in firms using nonprofessional
managers for all firms (720 observations). Thus, it
is concluded that with the increase of salary cost
incurred by non-professional managers (i.e., family
managers) then the firm productivity will increase,
otherwise if the cost of salary is lowered it will
lower the level of firm productivity. Furthermore,
there is evidence that increased productivity is not
due to professional or non-professional managers,
but more to the increase in salaries received by la-
bors so that they will continue to improve their per-
formance that will ultimately increase the firm pro-
ductivity. Table 7 above also indicates that the in-
dustry specification for the type of industry in the
main sector of the family business has a significant
negative effect on firm productivity.
Then, on the specification of return of capital
which replaces the previous dependent variable by
dividing the value-added with total capital also pro-
duces a significant negative effect. It is similar to the
previous results above, where productivity decreases
when the variable control of return of capital as in
the above table increases. Moreover, the rest of con-
trol variables do not affect the firm productivity.
Ultimately, the results as shown in Table 5 and 6,
and supported by the results in Table 7 above con-
clude that professional managers are more produc-
tive than family managers. Thus the third hypoth-
esis which states that family firms prefer to hire pro-
fessional managers rather than family managers is
supported.
DISCUSSION
The first hypothesis in this study states that
family ownership negatively affects the firm pro-
ductivity. The results of the analysis in this study
support the first hypothesis where the regression
output shows that family-owned firms are less pro-
ductive than nonfamily-owned firms. It means that
the existence of family ownership within a company
tends to decrease the firm productivity as measured
by the Standard Cobb-Douglas production function.
In other words, the greater the proportion of shares
owned by the family members will further decrease
the firm productivity. These findings support the
argument stating that negative effects will arise when
the next generation of the family in the firm runs
the business, so the bigger and longer family shares
ownership in the firm will decrease the firm pro-
ductivity as revealed by Cucculelli & Micucci (2008).
It is because there is a tendency that when the shares
owned by family members is so dominant, the con-
cept in the agency theory which states that the domi-
nant role of family members in managing the firm
will create an entrenchment effect that will encour-
age the owner from the family members to take the
rights of minority shareholders for the benefit of
their group which will ultimately reduce the
company’s performance (Anderson, Mansi, & Reeb,
2003). The findings of this study also support the
arguments from Gómez-Mejía et al. (2007) and
Lumpkin, Brigham, & Moss (2010) where the con-
flict of interest among family members can distort
incentives due to kinship behavior in the firm’s
management that ultimately can reduce the firm
productivity.
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These findings are in-line with Caselli & Di-
Giuli (2009), and Sciascia and Mazzola (2008) who
found that family firms generally led by managers
from family members tend to have lower produc-
tivity than non-family firms generally led by pro-
fessional managers. The findings in this study are
also in-line with Barth, Gulbrandsen, & Schøne
(2005) who found that the productivity rate in fam-
ily-owned enterprises is lower than non-family en-
terprises with an estimated difference of 10%. Simi-
lar findings are also found in Bloom, Sadun, & Van
(2008), Bandiera et al. (2008), and Mannarino, Pupo,
& Ricotta (2011) who found that firms with domi-
nant family shareholdings in Italy tend to be reluc-
tant to hand over corporate leadership to non-fam-
ily entities so that productivity is worse than non-
family firms led by professional managers from ex-
ternal parties. Furthermore, the results of this study
also confirm the findings of Morikawa (2013) in Ja-
pan and Cucculelli et al. (2014); Barbera & Moores
(2013); and Damieni, Pompei, & Ricci (2016) in Italy
stating that the productivity of family businesses is
far below non-family businesses.
Furthermore, the second hypothesis states
that professional managers are more productive in
running a business than family managers. The find-
ings in this study also support the hypothesis. The
results show that family-owned firms (which use
family managers) are less productive than
nonfamily-owned firms and are also compared to
family-owned firms that use professional manag-
ers. The company’s productivity range measured
using the production elasticity in the family-owned
firms is higher in the productivity level when hir-
ing professional managers 12.5%   compared to fam-
ily managers. This finding also supports the third
hypothesis which suggests that family firms should
hire professional managers, not family managers to
increase the firm productivity. It is because this
study is able to prove that the hiring of professional
managers in the family business is much more pro-
ductive than family managers.
The findings of this study support the con-
cept of cost of family management in the agency
theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Anderson, Mansi,
and Reeb, 2003) stating that the use of family man-
agers can reduce the company productivity because
the selection process of managers from the family
members does not follow a professional criteria/
standards, so it is likely to result in selected manag-
ers with poor professional qualifications. Ultimately
these low-qualified managers will decrease the firm
productivity. This condition will not occur in the
selection of managers from independent profession-
als wherein the selection process through recruit-
ment with intense competition so that the company
will get a choice of managers with excellent profes-
sional qualifications.
The findings of this study confirm Caselli &
Di-Giuli (2009) and Sciascia & Mazzola (2008) who
found that since family managers are generally re-
cruited without requiring certain qualifications as
recruitment of professional managers, family man-
agers will tend to have lower productivity compared
to professional managers. This study also confirms
Barth, Gulbrandsen, & Schøne (2005) who found
family firms led by family managers characterized
by being too cautious in the strategic decision mak-
ing. Barth, Gulbrandsen, & Schøne (2005) compared
family businesses managed by managers from fam-
ily members and family businesses managed by pro-
fessional managers. The results concluded that fam-
ily firms managed by professional managers are
more productive than those family firms managed
by family managers. Further, Barth, Gulbrandsen,
& Schøne (2005) examined the personal benefits of
year-round control and usage in family ownership,
the year of establishment, and preferences for fam-
ily control as an instrument to choose between hir-
ing professional managers or family managers. As
a result, the owner’s management may also have a
negative effect because, in the owner-run family
business, top managers are drawn from a limited
number of talented people than when managers are
recruited from the general market for managers.
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This condition causes managers to be lack of inno-
vations that ultimately leads to lower productivity
of family managers.
Furthermore, the findings of this study are
also in line with Molly, Laveren, & Deloof (2010) in
a management succession study in a family-con-
trolled firm, which found that the appointment of
the successors tends to follow a period of poor op-
erating performance in the early periods despite
recovery in subsequent periods, indicating that
management functions are endogenous. In owner-
run family businesses, middle managers know they
have little hope of reaching top management posi-
tions in the company. Limited career prospects can
serve as a disincentive for middle managers. The
owner-manager has a strong preference for control.
Often, these preferences may require inefficient con-
centration of decision-making authority in the hands
of people with interest (Goffee & Scase, 2015). Their
control orientation can also prevent them from
adopting new management style and personnel-style
policies that will ultimately impact the decline in
company productivity. According to Burkart,
Panunzi, & Shleifer (2003), this situation generally
leads to lower quality among owner-managers than
among professional managers and can be detrimen-
tal to company productivity. Mannarino, Pupo, &
Ricotta (2011) empirically assessed whether firms
run by family managers are less or more produc-
tive than firms run by professional managers dur-
ing the period 2004-2006 in Italy. The findings sug-
gested that professional managers are more efficient
in managing the business than the owner-manag-
ers/family managers. Then, the findings of this
study are also in line with Bloom, Sadun, & Van
(2008), Bandiera et al. (2008), Barbera & Moores
(2013), Cucculelli et al. (2014), and Lodh, Nandy, &
Chen (2014) who found that professional managers
are more productive than family managers.
From the acceptance of the three hypotheses
as discussed above, this study makes an important
contribution to the development of accounting sci-
ence especially in Indonesia in the form of empirical
evidence where family ownership negatively affects
company performance as measured by firm produc-
tivity. Thus, as the first study in Indonesia to exam-
ine the effect of family ownership on productivity,
these findings provide empirical evidence criticiz-
ing the findings of previous studies in Indonesia that
mostly found a positive relationship between fam-
ily ownership and firm performance as measured
by ROA and Tobin’s Q. This study proves that when
the company performance’s proxy is replaced by the
firm productivity measured by the Cobb-Douglas
Standard production function then the relationship
becomes negative. It is in line with the argument
discussed in the introduction that unlike account-
ing measures (ROA, ROE, and ROI) that are for ex-
ternal purposes which are easily manipulated by
accountants, the production function is an internal
measure that tends to be displayed in its real condi-
tions. Therefore it will be more accurate to measure
company performance. As for Tobin’s Q, then this
proxy will be used more accurately when the capi-
tal market is in an efficient condition with the spread-
ing of share ownership. Due to the inefficient capi-
tal market conditions in Indonesia, the use of Stan-
dard Cobb-Douglas production function modified
by Barth, Gulbrandsen, & Schøne (2005) is more
appropriate for measuring the performance of firms
in Indonesia, where the majority of listed firms on
the Indonesia Stock Exchange have dominant fam-
ily ownership.
Another important finding of this study is that
the use of professional managers will increase the
company productivity compared to the use of fam-
ily managers. It proves that the existing model of
the agency relationship in the Indonesian listed firms
tends to create an entrenchment effect rather than
an alignment effect because of the dominance of
family ownership. Therefore, the hiring of profes-
sional managers will be able to reduce the entrench-
ment effect due to the professional managers will
work in accordance with the standards of profes-
sionalism. In the other word, the professional man-
agers can be removed at any time when they per-
Family Involvement in Firm’s Management  and Productivity: An Empirical Evidence from Indonesia
Eko Suyono
| 273 |
form poorly, triggering them always to perform
well. Meanwhile, the use of managers from the fam-
ily members tends to increase entrenchment effect
because they can take the rights of minority share-
holders for the benefit of their group. This condi-
tion will negatively affect the company productivity.
CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS
Conclusions
This study compares the performance of fam-
ily firms and non-family firms with performance
measurement using productivity as measured by
Standard Cobb-Douglas production function. This
study finds empirical evidence that the number of
family firms in Indonesia during 2011-2015 is more
than nonfamily firms with 65.97%. Moreover, this
study documents that family firms more prefer to
hire professional managers than managers from fam-
ily members. This study concludes that family own-
ership negatively affects the firm productivity, pro-
fessional managers are more productive than fam-
ily managers, and family firms will be more pro-
ductive when hiring professional managers rather
than family managers.
Suggestions
The practical implication of the findings of this
study is that the appointment of professional man-
agers would be better for family firms than the ap-
pointment of family managers. It is because the pro-
fessional managers will be committed to their pro-
fessional contract so they will devote their poten-
tial to improve the firm productivity, which ulti-
mately will improve the company performance. It
is also because company owners can fire professional
managers at any time when they perform poorly,
so professional managers will always be compelled
to perform well. In other words, decreasing pro-
ductivity in family firms will be minimized when
the firms appoint professional managers to run the
business.
Moreover, one of the limitations of this study
is different from studies abroad regarding deter-
mining sample criteria based on the environmental
conditions in Indonesia. Therefore, a slightly dif-
ferent analysis is used in determining family man-
agement and productivity relationship by using
more simple analysis than previous studies abroad.
For example, unlike previous studies abroad which
used listed and nonlisted companies as a sample,
this study only uses listed companies as a sample.
So it would be more perfect if the next researchers
in Indonesia can use two categories of samples, i.e.,
listed and nonlisted companies. Therefore, the sci-
entific contribution in this field of study would be
more optimum.
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